For years the standard thing to do with a stolen cloud credential was to mine cryptocurrency. It was noisy: large GPU instances appeared, and the bill followed.
In May 2024, researchers at Sysdig described something different. Attackers with stolen cloud credentials were not launching servers. They were calling the victim’s managed AI services and running large language models. Sysdig called it LLMjacking.
We have since handled an incident that followed this pattern closely. Here is how it works.
The mechanics
Cloud providers offer hosted AI models as a service. On AWS it is Amazon Bedrock. You call an API with a prompt, the model answers, and you pay per unit of text processed.
An attacker who holds a valid credential with permission to use that service can do the same, on your account. Typically they:
- Obtain a key. From a public repository, a compromised machine, a leaked configuration file, or a vulnerable application.
- Check quietly what it can do. Sysdig observed attackers probing whether models were enabled using calls designed to reveal access without generating obvious activity.
- Enable what is not enabled. With enough permission, they request model access themselves.
- Put a proxy in front. The stolen access is wrapped in a reverse proxy and resold or shared, so many people’s prompts flow through the victim’s account.
What it costs
Sysdig’s original estimate was that abusing one high-end model at quota limits across multiple regions could cost a victim more than US$46,000 a day. It later said newer models could push that two to three times higher. Those are worst-case ceilings, not typical bills. Real incidents are usually smaller, and still painful.
Sysdig also published observed activity: more than 85,000 requests to Bedrock in one case, 61,000 of them inside a three-hour window.
Separate research described by Krebs on Security, in which a deliberately exposed key was left as bait, produced a bill of about US$3,500 in two days, most of it from a chat service that had hijacked the key.
Why it is attractive
Nothing to find on disk. No instance, no malware, no file. Only API calls.
Nobody is looking. A company that has never used Bedrock has no dashboard for it and no alert on it.
It is resellable at once. Model access has a ready market.
Region limits often miss it. In one AWS organisation we manage, the region restriction policy generated by AWS exempted Bedrock from the regional limit. A team that believed everything outside Singapore was blocked would have been wrong about this one service.
The fix is one policy
If your business does not use Bedrock, deny it for every account in the organisation with a service control policy. A service control policy sits above the account. It applies to administrators too, so a stolen administrator key gets an access-denied error.
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "DenyBedrock",
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": ["bedrock:*", "bedrock-mantle:*", "bedrock-agentcore:*"],
"Resource": "*"
}
]
}
Two things to know.
Service control policies do not apply to the management account. Protect that account differently: keep no workloads in it, and add an equivalent deny to the permission set people use to sign in.
Test it. From inside a member account, try to list models and invoke one, in more than one region. You want an explicit deny.
If your business does use Bedrock, the same idea applies with a narrower shape: allow it only in the account and region that needs it, only for the role that calls it, and alert on usage outside the normal range.
The rest of the defence
Blocking the service removes the payoff. Removing the key removes the opening.
- No long-lived access keys. Use single sign-on with short-lived credentials for people, and roles for workloads.
- Budgets and anomaly alerts. They do not stop spending, but they shorten the time to notice from a billing cycle to a day.
- An audit trail in every region, stored where an attacker with account access cannot delete it.
What to do this week
- List every access key in your AWS accounts and find out where each one lives.
- Decide whether you use Bedrock. If not, deny it.
- Turn on a cost anomaly alert that emails a person.
- Read what happened to one of our clients, and the full baseline.